Good Riddance!

CNBC’s Fed fanboy, Steve Liesman, accidentally knocked one out of the park yeserday when he lured Janet Yellen into a quip that will surely go down as the signature insanity of her baleful tenure. Liesman thus queried:
“Every day it seems the stock market goes up triple digits… is it now, or will it soon become a worry for the central bank that valuations are this high?”
After a bit of double talk interspersed with gobbledygook, Yellen uttered the money quote:
”There is nothing flashing red there or possibly even orange,” on asset valuations…
Holy cow!
Surely our soon to be pensioned-off Keynesian School Marm was not thinking about the fact that the S&P 500 stood at 2662 as she spoke, which amounts to 24.9X the $107 per share of earnings posted by America’s leading companies for the LTM period ending in September 2017.

This post was published at David Stockmans Contra Corner on Thursday, December 14th, 2017.

Bubble Finance And The Era of No-See-Um Recessions

Today’s single most dangerous Wall Street meme is that there is no risk of a stock market crash because there is no recession in sight. But that proposition is dead wrong because it’s a relic of your grandfather’s economy. That is, a reasonably functioning capitalist order in which the stock market priced-out company earnings and the underlying macroeconomic substrate from which they arose.
Back then, Economy drove Finance: You therefore needed a main street contraction to trigger tumbling profits, which, in turn, caused Wall Street to mark-down the NPV (net present value) of future company earnings streams and the stock prices which embodied them.
No longer. After three decades of monetary central planning and heavy-handed falsification of financial asset prices, causation has been reversed.
Finance now drives Economy: Recessions happen when central bank fostered financial bubbles reach an asymptotic peak and then crash under their own weight, triggering desperate restructuring actions in the corporate C-suites designed to prop up stock prices and preserve the collapsing value of executive stock options.

This post was published at David Stockmans Contra Corner on Wednesday, December 13th, 2017.

Just How Dangerous Is Trumps Latest Fed Board of Governors Pick?

Last week, Pres. Donald Trump nominated Marvin Goodfriend to fill a vacancy on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. When we reported the news, we called him ‘another swamp creature’ – a member of the Washington D. C./Wall Street clan Trump promised to drain away.
We’re not alone in our thinking. In an article on the Mises Wire, Tho Bishop called Goodfriend’s nomination ‘a dangerous act of outright betrayal to Trump’s core constituency of working-class voters.’
It’s true Goodfriend’s views on monetary policy don’t fit in with the current Fed status quo. But that’s not a good thing. Goodfriend isn’t a fan of the conventional radical policy of quantitative easing. He’s actually a proponent of an even more radical policy.
Following is Bishop’s analysis in its entirety.
Donald Trump nominated Marvin Goodfriend to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors, one of the numerous vacancies that have emerged over the course of the past year. While his prior nominations of Jay Powell as Chairman and Randal Quarles as Vice Chair represented a disappointing commitment to the status quo, his selection of Goodfriend is a dangerous act of outright betrayal to Trump’s core constituency of working class voters.
The timing of the decision is ironic. After all, while Trump is busy lobbying Senate Republicans to support his desired tax cuts, he has decided to nominate a would-be central banker who wants to effectively tax the bank accounts of American citizens.

This post was published at Schiffgold on DECEMBER 5, 2017.

The Delirious Dozen of 2017

Yesterday we noted the massive market cap inflation and then stupendous collapse of the Delirious Dozen of 2000. The latter included Microsoft, Cisco, Dell, Intel, GE, Yahoo, AIG and Juniper Networks—plus four others which didn’t survive (Lucent, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Nortel).
Together they represented a classic blow-off top in the context of a central bank corrupted stock market. When the bubble neared its asymptote in early 2000, the $3.8 trillion of market cap represented by these 12 names was capturing most of the oxygen left in the casino. That is, the buying frenzy had narrowed to a smaller and smaller group of momo names.
That severe concentration pattern was starkly evident during the 40 months between Greenspan’s December 1996 “irrational exuberance” speech and April 2000 (when he told the Senate no bubble was detectable). In that interval, the group’s combined market cap soared from $600 billion to $3.8 trillion.
That represented, in turn, a virtually impossible 75% per annum growth rate for what were already mega-cap stocks. As it happened, in fact, $2.7 trillion or 71% of the group’s bubble peak market cap vanished during the next two years.

This post was published at David Stockmans Contra Corner on Wednesday, November 22nd, 2017.

The Mother Of All Irrational Exuberance

You could almost understand the irrational exuberance of 1999-2000. That’s because everything was seemingly coming up roses, meaning that cap rates arguably had rational room to rise.
But eventually the mania lost all touch with reality; it succumbed to an upwelling of madness that at length made even Alan Greenspan look like a complete fool, as we document below.
So doing, the great tech bubble and crash of 2000 marked a crucial turning point in modern financial history: It reflected the fact that the normal mechanisms of honest price discovery in the stock market had been disabled by heavy-handed central bankers and that the natural balancing and disciplining mechanisms of two-way markets had been destroyed.
Accordingly, the stock market had become a ward of the central bank and a casino-like gambling house, which could no longer self-correct. Now it would relentlessly rise on pure speculative momentum—- until it reached an asymptotic top, and would then collapse in a fiery crash on its own weight.

This post was published at David Stockmans Contra Corner on November 21st, 2017.