Russia, NATO, Stalin and Nationalism: John Batchelor Interview Stephen F. Cohen

The title of this episode is the ‘Return of Stalinism’ but in actual fact the discussion is more about the rise of nationalism that is occurring both in the West and in Russia. Cohen notes that in the United States it is an integral part of the election process (and perhaps less significantly about Washington’s foreign adventures); in the EU it is about the failures of the EU, especially the refugee crisis, and in Russia it is tied to the increasing threat of NATO on its borders. The latter now includes the so called ‘missile shield’ that has, with ribbon cutting fanfare, just seen Rumania added as the newest such missile site and newest threat to Russia. Putin, during his recent visit to Greece, has finally spoken out against these missile sites saying that as a threat to Russia they become targets of attack for Russia. That message is now clearly Russian policy should hostilities commence with NATO. Expect the obvious to be ignored.
But as a symbol of foreign policy success, for Russians Stalin has some credibility and now that Russians feel threatened the Russian Communist Party is planning to use his image during the coming election for the Dumas. He was a terrible despot, who killed millions, but as a military leader he had great success and Russians still debate his status. Cohen discusses how post Stalin Kremlin leaders dealt with the question until Gorbachev virtually defined himself as an anti-Stalinist. But now Russians are threatened again and Stalin is seen in a more positive way – ‘as an attitude of the people’, not as a regressive trend.
Cohen reminisces about how Russians would use Stalin’s image under post Stalin Soviet leaders as a quiet protest about failures of domestic government policies. And one can see the same today in Russia although ‘it is now commercialized and politicised’. This makes it a problem for Putin because the comparison is there to live up to when things go wrong and to defend against when the ‘Stalin label’ is compared to the present Putin regime. But Putin’s regime in today’s Russia, Cohen argues, does not in any way resemble Stalin’s state – nor a Soviet one -but, as Cohen points out, Russians know that the West did not put missiles on the borders of Stalin’s Russia.
In the last segment Cohen discusses the level of corruption in all areas of Russian society and how the perception of Stalinism has created myths about that leader. It is Putin’s domestic headache to address the corruption, but Stalin is seen, incorrectly, as a corruption fighter. Similarly Stalin’s collectivization efforts can be compared to the transformations under Putin, and while pro Stalin elements in the population proclaim Stalin’s efforts successful, the reality was very much more debatable. Putin’s successes, however, are far less debatable; they are very real. Putin has chosen the role of an anti-Stalinist leader. However, he is not seen as a leader who has taken a very hard line against provocative western interests (NGOs and media) within Russia and to an enemy NATO outside – as Stalin surely would have. This reality may have changed this past week with Putin’s warning to NATO that missile sites along Russian borders are now targets, and now the New Cold War is one more step closer to the military response.

This post was published at Audioboom