The history of post Cold War US involvement in Iraq is the story of the enduring power of myths to drive a false foreign policy narrative and achieve the goals of a singularly-focused pressure group (the interventionist neocons). From the 1990 myth that Saddam Hussein had on his own and in opposition to stated US wishes made a land grab in Kuwait, the myth that Iraqi troops were poised to invade Saudi Arabia, the 2003 myth that Saddam had, ‘in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons,’ to the myth that the invasion of Iraq would be a ‘cakewalk,’ to the myth that the US attack on Iraq would bring the Iraqi people ‘hope and progress.’
But perhaps one of the most enduring myths of all, endlessly reinforced by the media, has been that after the disastrous aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq, a few brilliant military philosophers in the Pentagon came up with a ‘surge’ in tandem with a new ‘counterinsurgency doctrine’ that snatched victory in Iraq from the jaws of a horrible, scorched earth defeat.
The ‘Surge’ of some 20,000 additional American troops along with the cancellation of out-rotations of many others is said to have been responsible for an end to – or at least a great reduction in – the almost unimaginable levels of violence in Iraq, both among Iraqis and toward the US occupying army. In the words of then-President George W. Bush, the purpose of the surge was ‘to help Iraqis clear and secure neighborhoods, to help them protect the local population, and to help ensure that the Iraqi forces left behind are capable of providing the security.’
In fact none of those goals was reached. Zero.
This post was published at David Stockmans Contra Corner by Daniel McAdams ‘ April 18, 2016.
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